In contrast to the private-led initiative typified by the US Information Superhighway project in the early 90s, the Korean government was in the forefront of directing the Korean Information Infrastructure (KII) project (1995)(1996)(1997)(1998)(1999)(2000)(2001)(2002)(2003)(2004)(2005), which was aimed at building a nationwide broadband backbone network. This study first looks at how the developmental mechanism of Korea during the KII project signifies the weaker status of the civilian government of the 90s. This study then shows how in the KII project, the government served primarily as a moderator mediating conflicts between the private sector and the relevant public agencies. To describe the close state-capital linkages in the KII project, this study focuses on the government's financial investment system for enticing the private sector to install the IT infrastructure, the neatly coordinated policy networks between the public and private entities, and the policy discourses by which the government achieved a national consensus on IT-driven economic development.
Introduction
Since the late 80s, the Korean government had to rapidly transform its developmental mechanisms in response to external pressures such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreements and the US-Korea bilateral trade negotiations and internal ones such as the mass protest against the authoritarian state since 1987, the growth in power of the elite Chaebols, -the Korean form of crony capitalism i -and the decline of the foreign market due to the Korea's export-oriented manufacturing industry. Driven by the global-local dynamics, the "strong state" model in Korea has gradually withered and been replaced by the "flexible state" or "market-driven state."
The Korean Information Infrastructure (KII) project was designed during this decline in the power of the state. Imitating the US National Information Initiative (NII), the KII's main goal was to interconnect the public agencies through a high-speed broadband network, and eventually to promote IT productivity in the private sector and to create a larger job market through this network. In contrast to American NII initiative, which was led by the private sector, in Korea the government took the leading role in guiding the KII from start to finish. Through the KII project, the three major stakeholders -the state, the national telecom duopoly (KT and Dacom), and the Chaebols -have become deeply interpenetrated, by means of state financial support, organizational collaboration, and a hegemonic consensus manufactured by the government's IT-related rhetoric. The KII project represents a mixture of the old and the new developmental state model, which is characterized more by the collaborative ties between the state and the private sector rather than by the state's dominance over the private sector. Inheriting the legacy of the old developmental state, ii the KII project was a final example of the state's ability to launch, guide, and complete a major national IT policy initiative.
This paper is a policy analysis of the KII project as an example of an evolving phase of the developmental state model. This policy analysis aims to detail the deep structure of the relationships between the state and large capital directly involved in implementing the KII project, investigating how they enter into alliances with each other and how they articulate their own interests as they relate to implementing the project.
Within political elites in Korea, the KII project is seen as a very recent successful story of state interventionism since the Korean economic crisis of 1997. Many scholars view the IT project in Korea as the "second" phase of the Asian economic miracle: the first phase involved Asia catching up to the West in the industrial economy, while the second phase involves Asia becoming the leader in IT fields. The objective of the paper is to challenge the optimistic view of the ostensibly successful IT project in Korea, and instead to focus on the hidden mechanisms for implementing the KII project. In so doing, this paper seeks to observe the state-business linkages and the sacrifice of other stakeholders in order to create or maintain those links.
Research method
Confronting East Asia's economic "miracle" during 1970s and 1980s, a group of social scientists in the West turned away from neoclassical or market-centered view and dependency theories and developed alternative interpretations for the new phenomenon. The academic field known as "developmental state theories" rapidly grew to explain how the interventionist role of the state in the four "Asian Tigers" -Hong Kong, Singapore, South
Korea, and Taiwan -allowed these countries to successfully catch up with the industrialization of the West. Although the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, which represented a harbinger of global instability, diminished scholarly interest in "developmental state theories," it is obvious that, even after this economic turmoil, a rigid tendency toward state interventionism in the economy has survived in East Asian states, and the interventionist state has partly succeeded in promoting the national information economy -while simultaneously creating massive new labor market insecurities, the intensification of inequality, and exploitation (Burkett & Hart-Landsberg, 1998; Pirie, 2006) . At the theoretical level, this paper rereads the old developmental arguments anew, and rethinks those arguments in the light of the state-led KII project in Korea.
The purpose of this paper is to describe and analyze the contextual factors that Chaebols. In other words, the paper shows how the state, the rapidly growing telecom duopolies, and the Chaebols in Korea have become deeply interpenetrated, by means of state financial support, the organizational collaboration between these entities, and a hegemonic consensus. This paper limits the observed scope of the linkages to the government-led investment in the private sector and the organizational network of collaboration.
To investigate the symbiotic relationship between the state and the private sector in the KII project, this paper has the following structure: it first explores the scholarly literature based on the developmental state theories that has described the patterns of such collaborative ties. The analysis then focuses on the prior-investment system led by the government, the policy consultation bodies created for the project between the state and the telecom incumbents, and the government's IT policy rhetoric for creating a hegemonic consensus.
This paper concludes that the denser the network of state-business alliances or linkages becomes the more citizens are excluded from the decision-making processes.
This paper uses data from in-depth interviews with government officials from the Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC), the National Computerization Agency (NCA -now the National Information Society Agency), and the telecom companies KT and Dacom, as well as official documents relating to the project published by the MIC and the NCA that contain organizational charts and describe the major stakeholders' relationships and the changes in their policy network based on the shifts in specific policy goals.
The Transformative Phases of the Developmental State in Korea
In modern Korea, the concept of the developmental state arose under the first military regime , that of Cheong-hee Park, who came to power by coup d'état. Park achieved rapid economic growth by upgrading the import-substitution economies iii of the Syngman Rhee and Po Sun Yun (1960-62) administrations, which were largely dependent on US aid, to export-oriented economies through the state-bank-Chaebol nexus. Park's regime is commonly described as kaebal-dokjae, which means "economic growth through dictatorship." During the Park regime, government-business relationships were formed under the "overall guidance of a pilot planning agency" (Johnson, 1987: 145) Over 700 journalists were dismissed from their jobs and the remaining newspapers were subjected to a high degree of government control (Billet, 1990) . As another example of his use of state power against the Chaebols, in 1985 Chun dismantled the seventh largest conglomerate in the nation, the Kookjae group, which had around 200 subsidiaries at that time, merely because it refused to donate "political funds" (protection money, in essence).
This example shows that regime had the power to punish the Chaebols for the slightest disobedience, and also illustrates the rent-seeking relations between the ruling junta and the business elites.
Since the changing political climate brought about by the democratization movement of 1987, the public began to critique the symbiosis between the government and the 
The KII Project as a Legacy of The Developmental State Model
The close relationship between the state and economic conglomerates in Korea has often been termed jeongkyong yuchak ("the symbiosis of two entities"), which has a negative connotation. viii In this symbiosis, the government granted moneymaking licenses to, and invested public funds in, the largest conglomerates, and in return the Chaebols donated large sums to political slush funds. A unique mechanism of the developmental state is to transcend simple rent-seeking links between the two dominant elites and to transform their symbiosis into a mechanism for economic growth. Although developmentalism, promoted under the slogan of national modernization, conceals such chronic problems as an unethical business culture, power elitism, cronyism, corruption, corporate suppression of labor, deep class divisions, and the public's exclusion from the decision-making process, nevertheless, the unethical mechanisms of jeongkyong yuchak have been a driving force for economic growth, curbing the excessive penetration of foreign capital and enhancing the market competitiveness of domestic conglomerates.
Many scholars have explored the transformations of state-business relationships in
Korea, focusing on cross-regime variations in economic development, specifically, the shifting the balance of power between the two. Analyses of Korean state-business relations include a shift "from dominance to symbiosis" (Kim, 1988) ; "governed interdependence" (Weiss, 1988) ; a "pragmatic mix of government guidance with private initiative" (Jeon, 1994) ; the "patron-client relation" (Nam, 1994); a shift from "the stern but stable statedirected symbiotic partnership to a more unruly and erratic partnership" (Moon, 1994) ; "embedded autonomy" (Evans, 1995) ; "public-private reciprocity" (Fields, 1997) ; the shift from the developmental state to the "post-developmental" or "market-driven state" (Kim, 1999; ; "path dependency" (Jang, 2000) ; an "eclecticism beyond orthodoxies" (Clark, 2002; Clark & Jung, 2004) ; a "state-Chaebol alliance based on a more populist social contract" (Hundt, 2005) ; a "transformative state in which the state acted as senior partner rather than commander-in-chief" (Cherry, 2005) ; and the demise of "Korea, Inc." (the statebanks-Chaebols complex) and the rise of "neoliberal consensus" (the coalition of Chaebols, technocrats, politicians, economic experts, and NGOs) (Lim & Jang, 2006; Lee & Han, 2006) . 
The Close State-Business Linkages Throughout the KII Project
The major goal of Young-Sam Kim's administration was to shift Korea away from its exportcentered economy, which had been the major mechanism of market productivity under the military regimes, and search out a new source of profits for the domestic conglomerates. Kim 4969) which included the legal provisions for conducting the KII policy plan which set forth the R&D goals to be met, provided the funding for the long-term IT project, and established the top decision-making committee and its subsidiary bodies.
The KII project has been highly praised as a successful policy experiment by government officials, policymakers, scholars, and journalists from foreign countries, who focus on Korea's attainment of "broadband heaven" through vigorous state leadership and corporate cooperation. Few, however, have examined the inner mechanisms of the KII project's success such as the state-led funding structure, the special steering and intermediate committees, and the consensual dynamics of IT discourse. This section investigates the mechanisms that made the eleven-year state-led project viable, and examines how the statebusiness linkages have became more flexible and less consistent since the demise of the strong, repressive state.
Taming the Telecom Incumbents with the Carrot, Not the Stick
Information infrastructure projects such as the KII are typically burdensome to the private sector, and corporations are therefore usually less than enthusiastic about such plans, which involve massive, long-term investment, high risk, and uncertain returns (for this reason, the Clinton-Gore NII initiative failed to attract the necessary private sector involvement). To involve Korean Telecom (KT) and Dacom in the KII project, the Kim administration offered a variety of enticements: preferential tax treatment, the granting of new licenses, and investment loans underwritten by the government. KT, the domestic telecom incumbent, was relatively favorable to the government, which was its dominant stockholder until KT was completely privatized in 2002 (Kim, 5 June 2007) . The government had also allowed Dacom to acquire licenses for international and long-distance telephony services during the national telecom restructurings of 1990 and 1994, respectively, which were initiated for the purpose of curbing the international pressure for telecom market liberalization, and Dacom had rapidly emerged as the second largest telecom company in Korea. As a result, the government was able to gain the cooperation of the two telecom incumbents without any great conflict. A deputy director of LG Dacom described the situation this way:
The KII project was very supportive for the private partners in that the government minimized our business risk by its public investment. At that time nobody dared to invest the enormous funds for it; through the public funding, Dacom was able to leapfrog ahead by facilitating the nationwide optical networks. The contribution from public investment was highly significant. (Song, 29 May 2007) A manager of KT's Network Investment Planning Department also agreed on the effect of the state-sponsored investment:
It is obvious that the state-led "investment first, construction next" policy plan gave KT and Dacom the incentive to participate in the KII project without a great business risk, and also minimized the potential friction between the government and us throughout the project. In those days, KT, as the first partner in the government project, benefited from the immense state-led investment that allowed us to expand the optical networks. (Kim, 1 June 2007) The "investment first, construction next" principle was the telecom companies' major incentive to join in the KII project, allowing them to minimize their investment risk and cost at the earlier stage of the project. KT and Dacom also regarded the huge project as a chance to upgrade their copper lines to high-speed fiber optic networks.
In the building of the backbone networks connecting the public agencies and institutions -the so-called KII-G -KT was allotted a 70% share and Dacom a 30% share.
The KII-public (KII-P) was independently built as a commercial network through the budget of the telecom companies themselves, and the KII-testbed (KII-T), the optimal high speed R&D network, was built by the public-private partnership. For the KII-G, its most important backbone network, the government invested a total of $US6.2 billion over the three phases.
At the beginning, the government as the major stakeholder aimed to own the backbone network directly and grant the telecom companies a 25-year lease to it. The governmentspecifically, the MIC as funding distributor and the National Computerization Agency (NCA, now the National Information Society Agency) as funding manager and coordinator -also pressured the telecom operators to apply an 80% or 90% discount to the proposed online service charges for public agencies that would become subscribers in September of 1997. As
Che-Hyun Jo, the Deputy Director of Dacom and one of the key actors in the KII-G project, noted in his official interview with the NCA (2005), the discount rate requested by the government was burdensome, and the mood became very dark within the telecom companies.
The sensitive issues of the KII-G network ownership and service charges triggered critical conflicts between the government and the private sector. In addition, the Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI)'s questioning of the MIC's funding method for installing the optical lines in 1996 jeopardized the completion of the project itself (NCA, 2005, p. 130-131) .
This crisis at the early stages of the project (1995) (1996) (1997) finally caused the MIC to change the subscriber costs and ownership structure: It decided to transfer ownership of the fiber-optic backbone lines to KT and Dacom and to establish a joint public-private sector KII fund (a so-called "bilateral netting account") out of which the KII-G would be built and out of which the government would subsidize 40% of the subscriber service charge. In return, the two telecom companies agreed to reimburse the joint fund a portion of their profits year by year until their government loans were paid off, and to offer a 40% discount rate to KII-G subscribers. As an interviewee who was an official at the NCA, which managed the cost system between two entities, commented, the new cost mechanisms for the KII-G enabled by the government subsidies led to a breakthrough in the conflicts between the government and the private sector (Rha, 28 May 2007) . Further, since a 40% discount and a 40% government subsidy was applied to the service charges, government agencies and public institutions were able to receive broadband Internet for 20% of the actual cost, and institutional users grew rapidly -from 2,184 subscriber lines in 1996 to 30,137 lines in 1998 .
Once a critical mass of subscribers had been reached, the government was able to complete the KII-G phase of the project without further difficulty.
The increase in subscribers from public institutions and agencies brought a more stable flow of profits to the telecom companies, and this, in turn, furthered the development of the KII-P, the commercial network. At this point, the government could not overtly intervene in guiding the KII-P because of external pressures ix brought to bear on the government. As an official of the NCA (now the NIA) describes it,
In the mid-90s, the government had no choice but to leave the KII-P's development in the hands of the private sector. Under strong global pressure to liberalize the telecom market, the government could not intervene in the market or lead the KII-P directly, but could only recommend the government's roadmap to the private sector. Otherwise, it might cause serious friction in US-Korea trade relations. (Jeong, 5 June 2007) Despite this, since 1997 the government has successfully stimulated private investment in the local loop and facility-based competition by introducing the so-called "cyber-building certificate program" into the KII-P. Through this certificate program, apartments and buildings were ranked according to their capacity to handle high-speed Internet. (Falch, 2007; Lee & Chan-Olmsted, 2004 ).
In sum, the domestic telecom companies were fully supported by the state both through the immense financial underwriting of the KII-G and the assurance of fixed subscribers and then the MCT's promotion of the KII-P through the certificate system together. Rather than the state dominating the private sector by top-town command, as in an earlier period, disagreements between the two were settled by a series of bilateral negotiations between the state and the telecom companies. As a principal researcher at the NIA notes, "These close public-private relationships reflect the specific political system of Korea" (Jeong, June 5 2007) . The KII project, thus, is a prime example of the limited or flexible state model -of the shift in state-capital relations "from dominance to symbiosis" (Kim, 1988) .
Intermediary Organizations for the KII Project
In the early 90s, before the launch of the KII project, the Economic Planning Board (EPB) -which then regulated the national budget office -was hesitant to allocate the immense public funds necessary for the project because its cost-benefit justification was weak.
Further, the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy (MOTIE) argued that most equipment for the networks fell under its jurisdiction and thus that the MOTIE was responsible for the KII project, whereas the MIC's focus was on the regulatory aspects of the network-based telecom market (Jeong & King, 1997) . The KII project, however, was seen as the engine in a plan for national economic growth, and neither bureaucratic gridlock nor budgetary concerns could long be sustained in the face of such a vision. The KII was developed in three phases, based on the shifting of specific policy goals.
During the first phase of building a backbone network (1995) (1996) (1997) and the second phase of backbone network completion (1998) (1999) (2000) , the KII-G Steering Council and the KII-G Service Council -which succeeded the KII Planning Board in 1995 -were assigned to monitor the ongoing probable issues and discuss the service cost, quality, and upgrade, with the private sector representatives. These Councils mediated a series of conflicts between the state and the private sector in the earlier phase of the project. In contrast to the KII-P, which was mostly left to the self-ruling mechanisms of market, the government steadily steered the KII-G project to completion by means of these intermediary organizations. By the beginning of the second phase of the KII project, President Dae-Jung Kim was politically overburdened with managing the IMF financial crisis and the WTO agreements, both of which occurred in 1997. The government considered requesting the National Assembly to reduce the budget allotted to the KII project but decided to maintain the pre-assigned quotas of the KII infrastructure investment. On the threshold of the third and final phase of the KII project (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) , the Kim administration began to focus on the backbone network as a significant catalyst for market development.
To comply with Kim's ambitious vision, in 2001 the government organized the Committee for the KII Advancement, which included the major private actors and public institutions involved in building the three backbone networks -the KII-G, the KII-P, and the KII-T. Figure 3 shows the organizational chart of the Committee for the KII Advancement. The Office of the KII Advancement -a new entity created by the NCAcoordinated the whole organization by mediating between the four Subcommittees: the KII-T Advancement Subcommittee, the KII-G Advancement Subcommittee, the KII-P Advancement Subcommittee, and the R&D Subcommittee. The logic of exclusion relying on the top-down policy-making process enabled the government to exhibit its cause rather than to hear the real voices of the citizens.
The Exhibitionist IT Policy Initiatives and Discourses
The government's nationwide IT policy was greatly mobilized by the technocrats'
"exhibitionist" policy discourses aimed at accomplishing the goal of "internationalization," a term that dominated the rhetoric of the Young-sam Kim administration (1993-98) The MIC's eKV06 states that its goal is both to promote the "information society" at the national level and to gain "strong ties of international cooperation with the global information society" (NCA, 2003, p. 10) . To do this, eKV06 declares that the government itself must "create a smart government structure with high transparency and productivity" (egovernment) and should encourage private corporations "to strengthen global competitiveness by promoting the informatization of all industries" (e-business) and enable citizens "to enhance their ability to utilize information and technologies" (e-education).
Through implementing these goals, the government hopes to persuade Korean society to become "a global leader e-Korea" (MIC & NCA, 2005, p. 100-104) . Once the KII project entered its final phase, the government's IT policy agenda targeted three areas: bureaucratic efficiencies through "smart government," e-commerce through the development of media contents, and mass digital literacy through the public and private educational institutions.
While the policy visions set forth in the e-government and e-business areas can be read as expanded and concretized provisions of the previous market-oriented IT policies, eKV06's addition of e-education for citizens seems to be a distinct advance on the policies of CK21 or the BPIP. It is notable as the first instance of the Korean government considering at a national policy level such public issues as the "information gap" between individuals and between regions. As is typical of the bureaucratic approach to the citizenry, the government restricted its role to inconspicuous tasks, such as supplying computers or promoting commercial
Internet access, as well as the routinizing and rationalizing of electronic services for citizen requests for official documents. The focus is on a quantitative approach that emphasizes outward appearance and growth, as seen in the dramatic growth of the IT industry, rather than on the "soft" aims of improving the cultural ability of citizens to access, use, and recreate information without restraints. The government promoted the cultivation of digital technology as a necessity for increasing the efficiency of government bureaucracy, to improve national productivity, and to become an active part of the global society. Strategies," xii issued in July of (NIA, 2007 . In BK07, the Roh administration also emphasized that the quality of life in Korea would be improved by the rapidly increasing opportunities arising from e-commerce with the completion of the KII-P. While Roh succeeded in promoting the development of an Internet-based society in Korea, it is apparent that his IT initiatives have overemphasized business-oriented growth policies based on values such as "efficiencies," "competitiveness," and "productivities," to the detriment of public welfare values such as "sustainability," "public commons," and "equal opportunities." Table 1 shows the major IT policy initiatives implemented by each civilian government. Interestingly, each president promoted a new IT-related discourse with its own IT policy initiative, especially at the beginning of his term. Kim (1993 Kim ( -1998 Dae-Jung Kim (1998 Kim ( -2003 Moo-hyun Roh (1995) (1996) (1997) 2nd Phase (1998 Phase ( -2000 3rd Phase ( education, e-governance, and e-commerce. Through the IT policy initiatives, each government gave the private sector -specifically, the Chaebols -its blessing, and persuaded its citizens to be a member of a Korean-style "information society." The state's promotion of IT to its citizens boomeranged on itself by increasing the consumption expenses per household: the rate of IT-related consumption (5.4%) per household in Korea is burdensome, almost double that in Japan (3.1%) and triple that in the US (1.6%) (Bank of Korea, 2005) .
Further, due to the bureaucratic desire of all three presidents, who hoped to bequeath a monumental policy inheritance to the citizens within their term, the completion year of the KII project was repeatedly moved forward, first to 2015, then to 2010, and finally to 2005, when it was actually completed. A principal researcher at the NIA observed,
The reason the KII project was completed by 2005 rather than by 2015 is directly related to the presidential pledges of each administration, which aimed to accomplish its political outcomes by "exhibitionist" policy initiatives. It is obvious that the three phases of the KII project were greatly curtailed or condensed in response to the inauguration of a new president. (Jeong, 5 June 2007) In fact, the four IT initiatives over three presidencies were often used to exaggerate the real conditions of Korean IT development, wrapping these up in exhibitionist PR. Consequently, the rhetoric of these initiatives -such as that of surviving global competition and of regenerating the national economy -successfully played upon the citizens' anxieties, such that there is now one broadband Internet per household, and allowed the state-led project to be completed with ease and even ahead of schedule.
Lessons learned from the KII project
The present analysis confirms the facts that, in contrast to the old military regimes, the civilian governments since 1993 have articulated various mechanisms, such as intermediary organizations and hegemonic strategies, in order to successfully guide the state-led infrastructure plan to completion. This paper also assesses the KII project as a prototypical IT policy reflecting an evolving phase of the developmental state model (the "flexible" state), an IT policy which was enacted in the midst of the shift from the "strong" state to the present "market-driven" state. As regards the Chaebols, the KII project has created the material conditions enabling them to become "e-Chaebols," incumbents in new IT sector, as well as in the traditional manufacturing sector.
Theoretically, this paper contributes to a critical reading of the developmental state theories through disclosing the negative effects caused by the symbiosis between the state and the Chaebols during the KII project and by relating the evolutionary phases of the state power to the Chaebols' economic growth. The present paper had its origins in questioning the popular belief among policymakers that the KII project has improved the quality of Korean society and culture and further upgraded the country's IT status in the global community. It is obvious that policy rhetoric that ignores the real conditions behind the successful KII policy plan creates a barrier to an accurate evaluation of the KII project by telecom policymakers, politicians, and communication scholars. In fact, Korea's developmentalism -its continuing efforts to catch up to the economic power of the advanced nations -has been founded on close linkages between the state and powerful corporate interests, which resulted in neglecting the participation of the citizenry.
The underdeveloped political culture of Korea led the KII project to be a half-ripe policy: it serves as the material foundation which has made Korea an IT powerhouse but also, as policy, it represents the already entrenched corporate interests. The present analysis has confirmed that the past legacies of authoritarian interventionism and developmentalism under the military regimes still haunt such projects as the KII. Although it was planned and implemented under civilian governments, the KII could not escape the authoritarian and undemocratic character of the politico-social structure inherited from the military regimes.
Conclusion
The Korean government's attempt to stimulate the private sector and to create new IT demand was extremely successful over the three phases of the KII project. Nevertheless, the process by which the KII success story was carried out raises at least one serious issue, that of the entire exclusion of the citizens, as previously mentioned, from the decision-making process of domestic telecom policies. In the same way, they have been excluded from the Ignoring the citizens in favor of the elites has been rationalized by the state logic that nurtures Korea's large Chaebols at the expense of her middle-and small-sized companies.
What is needed is a democratic force from below that can exert itself against such interests and assert instead the public's interest. It is an undeniable fact that even in today's Korea, "those with a connection to a few leading political figures have precedence over others who might be better qualified" to participate in policymaking (Hyun & Lent, 1999) . The backward political conditions in Korea -in essence, conditions of crony capitalism -combined with the dominant trends of contemporary global capitalism make it all the more difficult, and yet all the more necessary, to construct a democratic forum at the national policy level which is sustained from below to work on behalf of the public welfare against the proprietary interests of the Chaebols. Understanding the history of the KII project can provide insights into how to formulate future telecom policies along much more socially-interventionist lines while restraining the overwhelming power of the telecom oligopolies and Chaebols and soliciting the input of citizens and citizens' groups.
Notes
i A Chaebol in Korea means a family-owned business group with large subsidiaries occupying an oligopolistic position, despite a relatively low concentration of ownership and the absence of pure holding companies.
ii Whereas the earlier statists looked at the East Asian "miracle" by focusing on the disjuncture between the state and society and the dominance of the state over society (the old developmental state model), the neo-statists explore this economic success by focusing on the dense linkages between the state and the private sector (the new developmental state model). Even the neo-statists, however, point to the "state-induced deliberate shifting of the industrial structure towards higher technology, higher value-added products" (Weiss & Hobson, 1995, p. 150) . In fact, despite the varying emphases on the state-industry linkages, it is clear that both the old and new statists agree about the state's guiding role in the East Asian economic miracle.
iii Under Rhee's administration, the state granted the monopoly of the "three white industries" -the processing of cotton, flour, and sugar from the US -to the burgeoning domestic businesses that later grew to be the family-owned Chaebols such as Samsung and Hyundai. iv As an example of how Korea's political-bureaucratic elites maintained their dominant power over the interests of big business, Johnson (1987, p. 157) describes the establishment of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), which was founded as an independent political support apparatus, originally built around a 3,000-man cadre from the existing Army Counter-Intelligence Corps, which had expanded to some 370,000 employees by 1964. The KCIA's original mission focused on counter-communist activities and fighting military corruption. Under the military regimes, the KCIA was used as a domestic surveillance and spying agency to collect, analyze, and monitor intelligence data on businesses and the citizenry. The intelligence agency enabled the development of an extreme disciplinary society which controlled not only any citizen critical of the government but also overall business activities. v In the aftermath of 1997, a discourse about oeja yuchi ("the enticement of foreign capital") has dominated Korean society as it seeks to recover from the recession (Lim & Jang, 2006) . This discourse was used to legitimize the full-fledged opening of the domestic market to foreign investors. vi Since the 1997 financial crisis, the concentration of power in the hands of the larger Chaebols was accelerated by such events as the collapse of the Daewoo Group, the divestiture of the Hyundai Group, the change of the LG Group into a holding company, and foreign investors' takeover attempt of SK and KT&G (Lee, 2006) . vii In the financial crisis of 1997, when the IMF forced the Korean market to follow its structural adjustment program, many Korean mega-conglomerates collapsed in the re-structuring of the domestic economy that ensued, but Samsung seized its opportunity and jumped into first place in the domestic market. The different divisions of Samsung are now a set of huge monopolies, and the corporation as a whole ranks as number one among Korea's ruling conglomerates, accounting for one-fifth of the country's exports. Samsung Corporation encompasses almost every profitable industry under its business logo: Samsung Electronics, Samsung SDI, and Renault Samsung Motors, as well as Samsung Securities, Life Insurance, Credit Card, Heavy Industries, Engineering, Everland Theme Park, Advertising, Petrochemicals, Shopping, Cable Channels, and so forth. Samsung's rapid capital accumulation has been made possible by its omnipresent power in the Korean economy and society -described by such common terms as "Samsung's way" or "the Republic of Samsung" -and by its collaboration with the state in controlling the labor market. While Samsung contributed significantly to promoting Korea's national economy in the global market, its dominant market power, with a total of 62 subsidiaries and a sales record of $US1.39 trillion (as of April 2005), makes it a pervasive and overwhelming force in both the Korean economy and Korean society. viii In addition to jeongkyong yuchak, under Park's junta, the term gwanchi gyeongjae, or "state-controlled economy," was a commonly used to denounce the military elites' intervention in the market. ix The external pressures include the Korea-US bilateral negotiations, the trade sanctions imposed by the US Trade Representative (USTR), and the WTO regulatory system. x Under the "cyber-building certificate system," the government set standards on domestic and business premises with three levels according to their capacity to handle high-speed Internet traffic capacity, and granted the certificates to qualified buildings. This certification gave builders a motivation to enhance the broadband access platform of apartments and buildings. (Yun, Lee & Lim, September 2002; Lee & Chan-Olmsted, 2004) . xi President Roh has been described as "the world's first president to be elected with the broad support of the online generation" (Watts, 24 February 2003, p. 16) . His image at the time of his inauguration was one of being technically flexible and open to the Internet. Midway in his term of office, Roh held an unprecedented "Internet conversation with the nation" on 23 March, 2006, which had the largest audience in the history of online broadcasting in Korea. Moreover, the president himself uploaded five letters per a month onto the presidential website, named the Office of the President Briefing, in order to promote direct communication with the nation without the intervention of the press. His nickname "the night-owl president" is derived from his staying at the keyboard until late at night for decision-making and electronic approval of e-documents through the electronic record management system that he himself invented (Lee & Lee, 2009, in press ). xii IT "839" was dubbed from three pillars (services, infrastructure, new growth engines): eight telecom services (Wi-Bro, DMB, home networking, telematics, RFID, W-CDMA, Terrestrial D-TV, and Internet telephony); three infrastructures (broadband convergence network, U-sensor network, and IPv6); and nine new growth engines (mobile telephony, digital televisions and broadcast devices, home network equipment, system-on-chip products, next-generation personal computer, embedded software, digital content and solutions, vehicle-based information equipment, and intelligent robot products) (Shin, 2007) .
